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166 Book Reviews 
The Experience of Freedom 
Jean Luc Nancy 
(Trans. Bridget McDonald) 
Stanford University Press, 1993. 
Reviewed by Michael Lackey 
University of Kentucky 
Postmodern cliches (borders are fluid in time-borders of thought are so-
cially constructed-rigid classifications are arbitrary) are now so much with us 
that it is easy to see them as established foundational precepts. Surely the post-
structuralist decentering of the word has, if not directly given birth to, at least 
nourished these common assertions of the postmodern age. But if philosophy has 
been an attempt to lay a 'solid' foundation for systems of thought or ways of see-
ing, and if postmodern philosophy's foundation is the impossibility of establishing 
foundations (a foundational precept in itself), then the foundationless foundation 
must be securely (paradoxically) laid, lest philosophy today become a primitive 
leap of faith or an 'arbitrary' system of rigid classifications. In the tradition of 
Heidegger (though without Heidegger's closure of Being-rather, for Nancy, with 
the dis-closure of freedom) and Merleau-Ponty (armed with a methodology that 
recalls Merleau-Ponty's critique of the Cartesian precept, cogito ergo sum), Nancy's 
objective in The Experience of Freedom is to lay such a 'foundation,' though his 
conclusion is not likely to please today's advocates of borderlessness. 
According to Nan~y, freedom is a pre-cogito, pre-subjective (one hears 
Merleau-Ponty at this point in Nancy's analysis) 'reality.' It is subject to neither the 
determining or determinate synthesis of the cogito nor to the laws of causality and 
nece~sity. It is not a part of the human will nor is it a natural right. Unfounded, 
~lusive, ineffable-freedom cannot be reduced to thought. On the contrary, thought 
is .thought because freedom founds thought, surprises thought into action and per-
rruts thought to be (Das Wesen der Freiheit liegt in seiner Existenz). Thought 
~erefore ~annot define freedom; rather freedom defines thought, because freedom 
is ontologically prior to thought, to humans, to being: 
Freedom Manipulated (by powers, by capital): this could be the title of 
our ~alf-c~ntury: Thinking freedom should mean: freeing freedom from 
mampu.lahons, mcluding, first of all, those of thinking. This requires 
something on the ?rder of revolution, and also a revolution of thinking 
(164). 
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After this revolution of thinking, thinking would no longer analyze, classify and 
ground existence. Rather, thinking would encounter unanalyzable, unclassifiable 
and groundless freedom. If existence, according to Sartre, preceded essence, 
essence withdraws from existence, argues Nancy, when freedom unleashes itself 
as the ever-elusive, unfounded 'foundation' of existence. In this anarchic unleash-
ing of freedom's freedom, Kantian causality and necessity, the Hegelian dialectic 
and Heideggerian Dase in and Being become meaningless productions and deduc-
tions of thought. In other words, they are all post-freedom constructions and free-
dom is the parent and original. 
Though freedom has played an important role in philosophy, it has been con-
tinually incarcerated: hence, freedom has never been free to be freedom. Despite 
this semantic imprisonment, freedom, as the unfounded founder (the pun here is 
intended to be suggestively ironic, but not ironic through and through), has con-
tinually asserted itself (Nancy both anthropomorphizes and theomorphizes free-
dom throughout the work), insisting on its 'essence' as freedom. This is particu-
larly obvious in the works of Kant and Heidegger. Kant, as Heidegger has already 
shown, reduces freedom to necessity and causation, a move which thereby denies 
freedom its freedom. Consequently freedom, which seeks its own freedom, re-
peatedly problematizes Kantian thought. 
According to Nancy, the early Heidegger (from Being and Time [ 1927) to the 
1936 course devoted to Schelling's treatise "On the Essence of Human Freedom") 
gets close to liberating freedom, because he nearly develops '"a more originary 
thinking' of freedom" (39). However, by 1942: 
Heidegger firmly demotes freedom to non-'originary' thought, this is be-
cause at every point metaphysics presents him definitively (but this is 
nothing new since Being and Time) with the closure of a beingness of 
being (corollary to the subjective closure of the will that he recognized at 
that time, after having used up, as we've indicated, a motif of free will) 
(39). 
Heidegger's and Kant's philosophical systems, then, remain strained because free-
dom has not been securely founded as the originary groundless ground. 
The logical conclusion of Nancy's conception of freedom is his definition of 
evil (this is one of the most interesting and complex chapters in the book). Tradi-
tionally, evil was considered a negation of existence, god serving as the fullest 
manifestation of being. Evil, then, was a renunciation of god, or rather it was an 
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absence (no-thing) inserting itself in being as being. But for Nancy, "the evil that 
was 'nothing' has become 'something' that thought cannot reduce" (123). Since 
thought cannot rationalize evil out of existence, as thought has formerly tried to do 
by defining evil as no-thing, evil must then be the ontological equal of good. For 
this reason, Nancy speaks of the positivity of evil: "evil has not only been con-
firmed as a positivity, it is perhaps confirmed as the positivity of freedom" (133). 
As a positive 'reality,' "[ e]vil is the hatred of existence as such" (128). Since 
freedom is ontologically prior to thought, and since thought cannot reduce free-
dom to necessity, causality, a natural right, or anything else, thought must aban-
don itself to freedom, and not vice versa. But when thought does try to subject 
freedom to necessity, when it tries to systematize or conceptualize freedom, then 
thought, as an emissary of evil, denies existence, it refuses to acknowledge exist-
ence as such. In this instance, thought usurps freedom and fashions itself the 
groundless ground: 
to say of birth and death that 'we can only think them' means that we can 
only think in them, and that freedom is at stake in them. Auschwitz 
signified the death of birth and death, their conversion into an infinite 
abstraction, the negation of existence: this is perhaps above all what 
'culture' made possible (122). 
Borderlessness as the determining and determinate ground of postmodern 
thought, freedom as a natural right, a thought before freedom-these are the cur-
rent evils that plague philosophy. For Nancy, when such thoughts are the originary 
precepts of philosophy, 'culture' once again makes possible, what with dread, the 
undoing of freedom. Under these postmodern cliches, freedom is demoted to 
non-originary thought. According to Nancy, "existence as its own essence is 
nothing other than the freedom of beings" (23). With this definition in mind, 
borderlessness becomes not a foundational precept: rather, it is a pre-thought en-
tity. Borderlessness (as a clearly defined thought), therefore, cannot be the begin-
ning of any systematic philosophical doctrine: on the contrary, borderlessness, 
like freedom, can only be experienced before thought, outside of thought, on the 
'borders' of thought, for groundlessness is the ground of borderlessness. And, 
"[w]hat is groundless," according to Nancy, "is also to the same extent, perhaps 
more 'profoundly,' what comes-up from nothing, on nothing, what, instead of climb-
ing out of the abyss, freely rises up, suspended in free air, the simple pulsating of 
a released existence" (133) .. 
Though Nancy deftly argues his point, one is inclined to question his inflated 
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claims for freedom. At moments, freedom is described like the Jewish deity from 
the Kabbalah while at other times it appears to be a version of the Christian un-
moved move; who is apprehended only in the cloud of unknowing. Recently 
Heidegger's debt to the mystical tradition (in particular to Meister Eckhart and 
Angelus Silesius) has been more carefully documented and these studies help 
account for Heidegger's rather mystical claims. Such a study would also prove 
useful, not to discredit any ofNancy's assertions, but to give them~ ~Iler c?nt.eX:-. 
Because this work is so intelligently argued and so profoundly msightful: it is 
certain that it will be the impetus for many future studies in Continental philoso-
phy. 
Fighting Back in Appalachia: Traditions of Resistance and Change 
Ste1>hen L. Fisher (Ed) 
Reviewed by Phil Jenks 
University of Kentucky 
Stephen L. Fisher's anthology Fighting Back in Appalachia: Traditions of 
Resistance and Change can be read as a (postmodern?) response to the ~ate 1970~ 
Appalachian classic, Colonialism in Modern Ame~ica: The App~lachran ca:e. 
Whereas Lewis, Johnson, and Askins sought to delineate the relations of do~a­
tion through theoretical spheres of culture, political insti~tions,_ and eco~orm~s, 
Fisher's anthology seeks to formulate a more comprehensive notion of acti~e dis-
sent. Colonialism is a fantastic book, but the authors all too often fell. ~t~ a 
Manichean trap of bifurcating between Us and Th~ .. Thi.s ~rocess of essentia~mg 
the Appalachian 'native' risks reifying a monolithic ~sion of wha.t consti~t~s 
Appalachia and subsequently problematizes any narrative of collective and mdi-
vidual resistance. 
It would seem that Fisher et al. seek to reconstitute the Appalachian narrat~ve 
in such a way that a multiplicity of powerful voices can be hea~d, thus challengmg 
the legitimacy of singularizing Appalachia. Fisher seeks to dis~antle .the stereo-
type of the 'Appalachian' as a passive victim by documenting dissent lil Appala-
chia. The book contains an introductory essay by Fisher, and fifteen ess~~s b: 
activists and scholars in the field in three sections on "Grassroots Orgamzmg_, 
"Strategies in Labor Struggles," and (my favorite) "Culture, Class and Gender m 
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